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“…  do justice to the afflicted and needy. 
Deliver the poor and needy: rid them out of the hand of the wicked.” 1 
 
The right to democratic entitlement is well documented in international law. 
Numerous universal and regional constitutional treaties are premised on it and 
reverend it. National constitutions of most States espouse themselves to it. 
International civil society champions it. It is a right that resides at the core of the 
United Nations' originating vision for a secure and peaceful world - steered on the 
twin rails of social justice and respect for human rights. The current Zimbabwe crisis 
that came to a head at the 2002 Presidential election suggests that mere 
institutionalisation of this right under international law, regional law and national 
constitutional laws is not in itself sufficient to ensure its enjoyment. For this right to 
pass from enchanting rhetoric to practice that promotes and upholds the dignity of 
human beings everywhere in the world, procedural and other accounting strategies 
need to be developed so that impunity for its breach is stopped. This article examines 
the possibilities of enjoyment of this right in transitional States under present 
international arrangements. It concludes that for this to happen the international 
community needs urgently to demonstrate its commitment to the enjoyment of this 
right through (1) consistent application of interventionist mechanisms such as the 
SHIRBRIG initiative in situations where the right is at issue and, (2) development of 
efficient international, regional and national election audit systems with power 
effectively to strike down elections that breach the said right. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
   Condemnation of the 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential Election is widespread and 
convincing. The election has been variously described by the United States (US), the 
European Union (EU), Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway and by observers of 
the fourteen member Southern African Development Community (SADC)2 of which 
Zimbabwe itself is a member as “… fundamentally flawed and inconsistent with 
norms and standards of the SADC…”, “… a systematic subversion of democracy”, 
and as “… [a] poll marked by numerous, profound irregularities that ended in an 
outcome that thwarted the people’s will. [Consequently] Mugabe can claim victory 
but not democratic legitimacy”.3 Glenys Kinnock, Co-President of the EU/ACP  
(African Caribbean and Pacific) Joint Assembly in the European Parliament (EP) 
described it as “… a coldly calculated, pre-determined outcome resulting from 
draconian legislation, widespread and sustained political violence and intimidation”.4 
This condemnation stemmed from months of State sponsored political violence and 
intimidation, including torture, murder and rape of opposition party members and 
workers, repressive security legislation, a huge propaganda campaign by State media 
and, on the election day itself, the disenfranchisement of large numbers of people as a 
result of government engineered queues which forced people to wait in many regions 
for up to thirty hours.5 Reduction of polling stations in urban areas where opposition 
support was strongest resulted in several thousands of registered voters failing to cast 
their votes even after three days and two nights of queuing.  Curiously, neither the 
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South African nor Nigerian election observer teams wished to describe the election as 
free and fair though they both approved the result.6  
 
   Two things are clear from reports of events leading up to Zimbabwe’s 2002 
Presidential election. The first is the general discontentment of the Zimbabwean 
populace with its government. The second is a determination of that government to 
continue to hold onto power.7 What the long voter-queues showed particularly in the 
urban areas was a people that had waited long enough for a realistic opportunity to 
exercise their right to decide on the leadership they deserved and wished to have. 
Three consecutive days and two nights in a queue accompanied by swarms of 
aggressive anopheles mosquitoes hunting for warm human blood would not hurt, so 
long as it gave them the opportunity to get rid of a regime widely perceived to be 
repressive, arrogant and corrupt.8 But for many, even that opportunity proved 
illusory.9 Even President Mugabe’s loyal African allies - Nigeria and South Africa 
faced embarrassment as their election observers broke ranks with the official verdict 
that the election was “legitimate though it could not be said that conditions had 
existed for a free and fair election” and called the election a scandal.10 The 
Commonwealth observers found that “… thousands of people were disenfranchised 
and conditions did not allow for a free expression of will by electors”.11   
 
   This article examines the possibilities for enjoyment of the right to democratic 
entitlement in developing States that are dominated by repressive,12 arrogant and 
corrupt governments that fake democratic requirements with the hope of ordaining 
themselves with external legitimacy even though they may not have secured internal 
legitimacy of their own people. Discourse13 conceptualises democracy as:  
 
• an entitlement that all societies possess,  
• a human right that individuals are able to exercise through accepted 
procedures,  
• a criterion for the recognition of legitimate governance,  
• a justification for intervention and use of force, and as  
• an overriding principle upon which the international system is ordered.  
 
   What is at issue is the right of people everywhere, freely to decide their destiny by 
giving their consent to be governed by those that preside over them. Free and fair 
elections alone do not constitute democratic governance.14 However, the right freely 
to elect without prior authorisation the leadership of a State is a fundamental 
requirement of the democratic process. In conjunction with other rights, it fosters 
representative and accountable governance. The article shows that it is still the case in 
some so called “transitional States”15 that where the electorate is determined 
peacefully to remove from office a failed, repressive and corrupt government, 
enjoyment of the right to democratic entitlement depends on the establishment and 
development by the United Nations of mechanisms, processes and structures that 
guarantee real and free expression of the will of the people about who should lead 
them. These mechanisms should be capable of stopping in its tracks governmental 
abuse of individuals’ rights immediately State terror is at issue. State terror is a threat 
always to the object and purpose of the United Nations – the maintenance of peace 
and Security in the world. Victims of State terror would rather they had not been 
violated at all than be told that instigators of their assailants have been banned from 
travelling to Europe and suspended from one or two intangible fraternal organisations 
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that serve more as ego brushes of constituent governments than as forums for 
enforcement of their official objectives. Governments that use rape to intimidate their 
populations into submission to their own will to stay in power should not be allowed 
to last an extra moment or day among the colloquium of legitimate governments that 
do not represent a threat to international peace and security. Particularly in SADC 
States where the AIDS pandemic is beyond imagination, a raped woman would rather 
she had never been raped at all than be told that her attacker has been sentenced - no 
matter how severe the sentence. Similarly tortured, murdered and disappeared persons 
and their relatives would much rather the consequent status of “victim” had not come 
to refer to them as a result of State terror that the international community foresaw or 
knew about and did nothing significant to stop.  
 
1. Governments as trustees of the public  
 
   Personal failure is often kinder than public failure in that with the former, the 
individual remains relatively supreme both during and after that event. That is not the 
same with the latter because the stakes are much too high. Football managers in 
England and elsewhere are only too aware of the customary right of their supporters 
to ask them to step down and a new manager appointed if the performance of the team 
threatens the fortunes or even the reputation of the club. As one British minister of 
sport put it, football is cruel in that failing managers are summarily dismissed while in 
politics, they get five years. Whether they like it or not, and as a condition to their 
holding office public office bearers in democratic States are betrothed to the corollary 
duty periodically to submit to re-appointment or rejection of the same people, what 
Franck16 calls the validating process by which people choose those they entrust with 
power. “To achieve such a system of autochthonous validation, those who hold or 
seek political power have made a farsighted bargain comparable to John Locke’s 
social compact. They have surrendered control over the nation’s validation process to 
various others: national electoral commissions, judges, an inquisitive press and, 
above all, the citizenry acting at the ballot box.” This is a far cry from Zimbabweans’ 
experience in the 2002 Presidential elections. EU election monitors were thrown out 
of Zimbabwe although they had participated in the previous four elections. Judgment 
of the High Court of Zimbabwe to allow voting to continue for another day was 
disregarded. Consequently, several tens of thousands of people that had voted in 
previous elections were stripped of their right to vote. In opposition party strongholds, 
inefficient practices were deliberately employed to minimise the number of registered 
voters that could actually cast their vote. This is inconsistent also with the practice 
expected of member States by the SADC because the constitution of the SADC 
premises pursuit of the organisation’s objectives on democratic practice. Similarly, 
the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth States of which nearly all member States of 
the SADC are parties declares that democratic practice shall determine the issue of 
governance in member States’ territories.  
 
   Trustees hold office only by appointment of the proprietors themselves and not by 
default. As trustees of a people, a government operating under democratic dictate of 
its constitution must stand or fall in accordance with the universally recognised 
standards of democracy. Trustees’ only currency is the will and trust of the 
benefactor. Once that runs out, the benefactor, in this case the electorate has every 
right to revoke that currency and without hindrance to appoint another set of trustees 
of their own choice. Governments are instituted to secure the inalienable rights of 
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their peoples. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.17 This underlines the deontological internal aspect of the right to 
democratic entitlement that people possess against their own governments exclusive 
of any external contribution. But the right to democratic entitlement has a teleological 
justification in the sense that it has enormous capacity to advance other social goods 
such as peace, freedom, respect for human rights and economic prosperity.18  
 
   President Mugabe has sought to ward off accusations of electoral impropriety by 
invoking “non-interference in the matters of sovereign independent Zimbabwe”. This 
begs the question whether his regime has legitimate authority to the shield of “non-
interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State”, itself a well-established 
principle of international law.19 Jurisprudence shows that because the will of the 
people is the basis of the authority of government, regimes that inhibit expression of 
that will lack legitimacy.20 Secondly, it is now widely recognised that the manner in 
which a State treats its citizens is of interest to other States. The international 
community’s response in 1990 to Iraq’s brutality against its Kurdish population and in 
1999 to Milosevic’s against Albanian Kosovors are recent examples of application of 
the principle. Oppenhein21 writes that while there is general agreement that by virtue 
of its personal and territorial authority a State can treat its own nationals according to 
its own discretion, it is recognised also that there are limits to that discretion. When a 
State commits cruelties against and persecutes its nationals “ … in such a way as to 
deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, the 
matter ceases to be of sole concern to that State and even intervention in the interest 
of humanity might be legally permissible”.22 Thirdly, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States was intended to shield legitimate governments from aggressors that 
threatened independence of the target State. President Mugabe’s actions themselves 
are the biggest threat to Zimbabwe’s survival as skilled labour continues to leave the 
country, food riots loom and starvation threatens a country that when President 
Mugabe first came to power in 1980 prided itself on being “the bread basket of 
Africa” - exporting beef and dairy products to the European Community and many 
other products to various parts of the world.  
 
2. International law requirement of democratic governance 
 
   Literature regularly attributes to the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the 
requirement under international law of the right to democratic entitlement. In 
particular, the turn around in US foreign policy from appeasement of autocratic States 
during the Cold War to democratic enlargement23 after the Cold War is often cited as 
the trigger to the evolution of the right to democratic entitlement. In an effort to 
impede the possible spread of communist governments the US during the Cold War 
made itself strange bed fellows with States that demonstrated little if any respect for 
the rights of their own citizens. Those States got economic aid in exchange for their 
promise not to embrace communism. Uncharitable commentators view adoption by 
the US of the foreign policy of democratic enlargement after the Cold War as an 
attempt at self-atonement for this Cold War indiscretion. This is perhaps not a 
sufficient explanation for pursuit of a policy with such universal appeal and purpose. 
Democracy’s importance lies in its promise and real potential to realise the UN’s 
mission and to further the organisation’s purposes. It is associated with peace, respect 
for human rights and economic prosperity. Western policymakers are convinced that 
democracy is the matrix that will disperse those goods throughout the world.24 But 
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this right has more antiquated origins than that. Properly understood as the individual 
and collective right of a population to determine who shall manage its public affairs 
and welfare, the right to democratic entitlement is evidenced by three rights in the 
armour of human rights law. These are the right to freedom of expression, the right to 
self-determination, and the right to free and open elections.25 Some argue that the 
right to democratic entitlement thus construed requires that where a democratically 
elected government is overthrown then article 39 of the UN Charter, which refers 
specifically to matters threatening international peace and security should be invoked 
and humanitarian assistance given to restore democratic rule.26 In this sense the right 
to democratic entitlement is linked to the right to humanitarian intervention. 
 
a. The right to self-determination 
 
   Eminent jurists27 refer to the right to self-determination as the most probable source 
of the right to democratic entitlement. However, that is problematic first, because a 
certain class of people can only make claims to the right to self-determination under 
international law. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations of 24 October 1970 limited application of the right to self-
determination of peoples to three categories of people only, that is, those under 
colonial, alien, or racist domination, all of which are becoming rarer and rarer.28 
Many potential beneficiaries would be excluded that the norm targets if the right to 
democratic entitlement were limited to the scope of the right to self-determination. 
Secondly, linking the right to democratic entitlement to the right to self-determination 
misconstrues the content of the latter right in that until now, it has never been 
associated with a single outcome. Eckert29 writes that mandating that a people’s 
freedom is inextricably linked to a particular procedural model of democracy 
significantly constrains their right to make a free determination of their own political 
status. Similarly, equating democracy with contingent procedural elements such as 
multi-party system, elections does not in itself secure the goods associated with 
democracy. 
    
   The right to self-determination is often cited as an example of jus cogens.  
Consequently, any treaty calculated to place restrictions on its exercise or to deny it 
should be null and void.30Practice of this principle under the UN resulted in granting 
of political independence to colonial territories via the trusteeship scheme established 
under Chapter XII of the UN Charter (1945).31 General Assembly Resolution 1514 
(XV) of 14 December 196032 - the declaration that deals with self-determination is 
often cited as an example of soft law, though UN General Assembly Resolutions were 
not initially intended to have a binding effect on Member States of the UN.33  In fact, 
the declaration appears to give itself normative binding authority in its concluding 
remarks by comparing itself with the UN Charter. This is perhaps because it mimics 
the language of the preamble and various sections of the UN Charter itself. In this 
sense it emboldens and gives glow to the purposes of the UN Charter and perhaps 
warns against familiarity with the text of the Charter to the point of inaction.  It 
concludes with a clarion call upon all States to “…observe faithfully and strictly the 
provisions of the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs 
of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial 
integrity”.34 It states also that:   
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1) denial of or impediments to freedom constitute a serious threat to 
world peace;  
2) it is necessary to promote social progress and better standards of 
life and larger freedom; 
3) conditions must be created that ensure stability and well-being and 
peaceful and  friendly relations based on respect for the principles 
of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples;  
4) Universal respect for, and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for al be pursued at all times.  
 
   Textual analysis of this declaration suggests that what is critical is world peace. To 
achieve that it is important to pursue social progress, by which is meant better 
standards of life based on the pursuit of larger or ever increasing and not diminishing 
freedoms, including equal rights and self-determination of all peoples - both as a 
collective entity and as individuals. The right to self-determination that encapsulates 
equality of people individually within States and collectively as State entities. 
Ultimately this way of thinking confers as against governments the individual’s right 
to be let alone – “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilised men”.35 As against other States, this right to be let alone that the individual 
enjoys against the State translates into the norm against intervention in the affairs of 
States. This is a principle so democratic that its fair application purchases equity 
among States, respect among States and freedom of States to pursue their best 
interests. But an individual will not be let alone by the State, and could not claim 
breach of his right to be let alone if he breaches the rights of others to be free and to 
be let alone, neither could a State that breached its democratic duties and 
responsibilities towards its citizens expect other States to welcome it as a worthy 
member among the community of States that uphold their citizens’ democratic 
entitlements of freedom and equality with others. Such an individual/State cannot 
when penalised by the State or by the International Community for breach of the 
democratic chain that ensures national and international peace respectively plead the 
right to be let alone or the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of a sovereign 
independent State respectively because to do so would be to threaten national peace or 
international peace and security respectively. Article 39 of the UN Charter, which 
underlines the UN’s mission, would severely be compromised. Hence the argument 
that where a democratically elected government is overthrown, Article 39 of the UN 
Charter which refers specifically to matters threatening international peace and 
security should be invoked, and humanitarian assistance given to restore democratic 
rule.36 This is because “ … The way in which a government treats its own citizens is 
now a legitimate matter of international scrutiny on the part of governments and 
human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch.”37 The ICJ in the Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal 
v. Australia) hinged political legitimacy to preside over a people on that people’s prior 
demonstration of free choice so to be governed by their rulers.38 Free choice is the 
nexus to governmental legitimacy. To the extent that the 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential 
election has been condemned universally for its abuse of the electorate’s right freely 
to determine who will preside over them, the right to democratic entitlement remains 
illusory for the Zimbabwean population in spite of numerous references to it in UN 
Human rights treaties, Commonwealth States and SADC documents that apply to 
Zimbabwe. 
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   Growing global consensus for democracy that links to democratic governance 
satisfaction of States’ obligations and responsibilities under the various human rights 
treaties recommends that more than any other factor of international life,  it is both the 
deontological and teleological strength of the inalienable rights of people against their 
governments that is the locus of the right to democratic entitlement. Although the 
stock of human rights treaties in force do not explicitly declare this right, collectively, 
their compulsion of it is unmistakeable in the obligations and responsibilities that they 
impose on the State vis a vis the individual. For instance article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) refers to the right of individuals to participate in 
the governance of their country through participation in periodic and genuine 
elections to be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. This 
principle is emphasised further in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966). In article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (1981) the principle is severely restricted and watered down, pointing perhaps 
to an almost insipid reluctance among the majority of African leaders to submit 
themselves to their populations - what Mazrui in his Reith lectures describes as the 
“African Condition”39 that resists necessities of life to its own detriment. Legomsky’s 
evaluation of the reason why after more than half a century the UN appears to have 
merely scratched the surface of the vision of the organisation’s founding fathers 
shows that there is nothing peculiarly African about failure in this regard. This failure 
is seen by some as “… part and parcel of the human condition – a state of affairs that 
no law and no organisation can repair. Others … believe that, if only we work at this 
project long enough and hard enough, and not allow even major setbacks to divert us, 
we can at least approach the dreams and the aspirations of 1945”.40  
 
 b. The right to free and open elections 
 
   Through their own inconsistencies and incoherencies, governments often 
unwittingly plot their own downfall. Since its belated independence in 1980, 
Zimbabwe has held five separate elections to elect a national assembly and one to 
elect an executive President. None of the previous elections could have prepared the 
Zimbabwean electorate for the events that have compelled the international 
community to refuse to legitimate the 2002 Presidential election – something that the 
country badly needs if its economy is successfully going to be rescued from its rapid 
decline of recent years. Just before the election economists described Zimbabwe’s 
economy as the fastest shrinking economy in the world. Without international 
legitimacy, President Mugabe’s government will find it difficult if not impossible to 
secure economic aid and to attract foreign investment, which aid and investment that 
country badly needs. Ultimately, President Mugabe’s downfall may result from the 
widespread poverty and starvation threatening the country. Even the most autocratic 
rule cannot prevail over a starving population that has little else but its own life to 
lose. Legitimacy is key to survival of any governance because: 
 
Those who claim to govern cannot demonstrate that they have fulfilled 
the requirements of the democratic entitlement, even if they purport to 
recognise that entitlement. … Increasingly, … governments whose 
legitimacy is questioned are turning to the international system for that 
validation which their national polis is as yet unable to give. They do 
so to avoid the alternative – persistent challenge to authority by coups, 
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countercoups, instability and stasis – and to enable themselves to 
govern with essential societal acquiescence. What they seek is 
legitimization by a global standard monitored by processes of the 
international system.41 
 
   Given that the international community has refused to legitimate the 2002 
Zimbabwe Presidential election, continued rule of that country by President Mugabe 
will almost certainly break Zimbabwe’s ailing economy. The EU, Commonwealth 
States, US and other individual countries have taken already measures against 
Zimbabwe, including imposing economic sanctions with the hope that President 
Mugabe will resign. The scope of this sanction regime is most probably going to be 
expanded until President Mugabe complies with the international requirement of 
democratic entitlement for his country. This strategy is patronising to the target 
State’s population. First, it is as if the population had previously bestowed internal 
legitimacy to the incumbent government by validating it through the electoral process 
when in fact the sanction regime is described as the international community’s protest 
at the absence of internal legitimacy. Secondly, it is said that sanction regimes under 
these circumstances operate to strangle a government to collapse or to submission. 
But nothing can be further from the truth. In reality, such sanction regimes operate to 
maximise suffering of the target State’s population and to aggravate it to the point 
where it voluntarily takes violent measures to topple its unwanted repressive and 
autocratic government. How does this happen? - only through violence of the people 
against an illegitimate government. Often this violence sacrifices peace in the target 
State itself and almost always threatens regional stability. Should the UN resort to this 
approach, which threatens peace and security with the hope of achieving conditions 
that will allow in the target State, enjoyment of the right to democratic entitlement? I 
think not. The risk taken to threaten relative peace and security in the target State by 
introducing punitive sanctions may backfire with the consequent turmoil spiralling out 
of control to result in a failed State of which Somalia is one. Secondly, the means that 
we use to arrive at our goals are themselves like seeds sown into the ground and 
whose fruit will be our harvest once we reach our goal. Violent means nurture and 
beget violent outcomes. ZANU (PF) having failed to negotiate with a defiant Ian 
Smith resorted to means whose fruit is its government’s current defiance of the 
international community and repression of Zimbabweans in general. For this reason, 
economic sanctions that exacerbate instability in troubled States appear to be 
counterproductive.  
 
   However, such sanction regimes might be desirable where government and 
population are at one against international opinion. In other words, where there is 
internal legitimacy and validation of government practice that is inconsistent with 
requirements of international law, the errant State can serve to rehabilitate the target 
State and its people into everyone else’s world. Where a population is already 
pleading to the international community for international assistance to stop an errant 
government direct intervention of the UN to thwart that government should be the 
main priority because a government that lacks both internal legitimacy of its people 
and external legitimacy of other States is a threat to world peace and security. Such 
intervention provides immediate rescue of the target State’s population from abuse of 
its errant government and declares the sanctity of the human rights at issue. 
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   With neither internal nor external legitimization of the 2002 Presidential election 
and with the international community incrementally resorting to economic sanctions 
against President Mugabe’s government, it appears that Zimbabwe is tittering towards 
economic and political explosion that threatens world peace. That is perhaps what 
President Mbeki of South Africa sought to avoid by appearing to legitimate the 
outcome of the election in the first instance. Nonetheless, legitimization of a process 
that is inspired by fear of triggering undesirable consequences is not the same as that 
premised on satisfaction of predetermined standards. It contradicts the purpose of 
externally confirming that the government has secured internal legitimacy.  It appears 
that nothing short of nullification and re-run of the 2002 Presidential election will 
restore internal and external legitimacy to Zimbabwe. But this may be difficult 
because in politics, compromise and not justification often prevails even counter to 
recognised positive laws of both the State and international law. Were this to happen 
in this instance, and President Mugabe given a “face saving” option that did not 
justify the electorate’s right to democratic entitlement, the question would have to be 
asked about the validity in law of a bargain in a situation where it was manifestly 
evident that the promissory could not stick to his side of the bargain so that the 
promissee would never realise the exchange. International human rights law could 
avoid this type of conundrum by making the United Nations accountable for its 
promise to individuals, including its promise of the right to democratic entitlement. 
The UN should be encouraged and supported to develop mechanisms, systems and 
structures for the actualisation of its noble goals.  
 
   Intimidation of the electorate, disenfranchisement of the electorate, passing of 
repressive laws that made criticism of the incumbent President illegal and punishable 
with a term of imprisonment, exclusion of election observers that previously attended 
similar elections, bandaging of the electoral role and the rape and murders of 
opposition supporters and their candidates combined to make this election difficult to 
accept as a true expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe contrary to article 
19 of the UDHR (1948), article 25of the ICCPR (1966) and  article 13 of the ACHPR 
(1981). The right freely and openly to elect those that shall preside over the electors is 
the fundamental building bloc of any democracy.42 
 
c.  The right to freedom of expression 
 
   One of the unforeseen dividends of the Second World War was that it compelled 
thinking about the need for protection of the dignity of the human being under 
international law. The visionary leaders that gathered at San Francisco to hammer out 
strategies for securing lasting peace in the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War appeared determined particularly to reconfigure the entire relationship in law 
between the power of governments and freedoms of the individual.43Legomsky writes 
that they set out to do nothing less than create a new world order.44 The new approach 
required States voluntarily to agree to be bound by rules that created rights for 
individuals as against the State. This shuttered previous assumptions about the 
relationship between the individual and his State under international law. Previously 
international law had subordinated each person to a sovereign, similar to the way 
slaves, had belonged to masters and women to their husbands.45  
 
From this subordination followed several consequences, each limiting 
the subject’s personal autonomy. In particular, each person injured by 
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his or her sovereign was entitled by national law only to whatever 
remedy the sovereign grudgingly chose to allow. In most jurisdictions 
until quite recently, this meant, in practice, that there could be no 
realistic expectation of redress. For example, the maxim – ‘The King 
can do no wrong’ – largely immunised British governments from 
litigation initiated by a citizen seeking a remedy for alleged wrongs.46 
 
   Persons injured while in a foreign State and denied redress by its laws depended 
solely on the will of their own State to obtain on their behalf redress from the 
offending State. Often, this was an illusory remedy as States demonstrated little 
regard for their citizens’ private causes, particularly where the offending State was an 
ally. Thus, individuals’ protection depended on the conduct of their State, and 
Stateless persons were entitled to no protection whatsoever. “Moreover, a State’s own 
citizens were almost at its mercy, and international law had little to say about 
mistreatment of persons by their own government.”47 According to Legomsky, the 
new approach was law at its noblest.48 
 
   Treaty bodies that monitor States’ compliance with their obligations supervise most 
of these treaties.49 They go a long way to ensure that the rhetoric of conference halls 
solidifies into actual experience for the millions of people across the world. They are 
however inhibited from doing more by what Cohen50 calls the classic discourse of 
official denial of reports of treaty bodies. In literal denial, State officials refute that 
anything of the sort mentioned in the report ever happened. Interpretive denial 
involves State officials arguing that what actually happened is really something else. 
Implicatory denial argues that what happened is of no consequence because it is 
justifiable. Cohen observes a tendency when denial is at play, to link up the denial 
chain, starting with literal denial, and if it fails, moving on to interpretive denial and if 
that fails, invoking implicatory denial. This has the potential of sapping the 
determination of litigants that already would have had to exhaust local remedies as a 
condition to engaging extra-territorial human rights bodies. One way of limiting 
official denial is to review the reporting strategies, so that they become less attractive 
for States to engage the denial routine. However, in spite of these difficulties it is 
indisputable that treaty bodies are impacting enjoyment of respective convention 
rights in States Parties’ territories. 
 
   A common theme that runs through the stock of over fifty human rights treaties and 
which points to the right to democratic entitlement is the right to freedom of 
expression. Grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) 
which is often described as merely ephemeral and aspirational in that it failed to 
extract from States a binding commitment, the right to freedom of expression is 
couched in article 19. It is also evident in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) – article 19. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
supervises state compliance with the ICCPR. The HRC has established a steady 
jurisprudence on the application of the article 19.51 It is also evident in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) (1981) – article 9(2). The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights – the body that monitors States parties’ 
compliance with this the ACHPR has built up a comparable jurisprudence to that of 
similar treaty bodies in spite of the numerous operational difficulties it faces. It is not 
so much the jurisprudence of these treaty bodies on this right that this article is 
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concerned with as its philosophical basis which it is held points to the right to 
democratic entitlement. 
 
   The utility of the right freely to express our opinions lies in that it maximises 
personal autonomy. Such autonomy enables people to choose from the widest 
possible range of options where none could definitively be shown to be right or 
wrong.52 It extends also to freedom of political choice, and bolsters democratic 
processes by encouraging rational debate “ which, it was confidently expected would 
render it more likely that the best solution would found for any problem.”53 It is also 
argued that the benefits of a general principle permitting freedom of expression far 
outweigh the disbenefits resulting from particular applications of the rule.54 This 
market-place-of-ideas model of free speech acknowledges equality of individuals 
caught up in the same place at the same time and sharing certain common challenges, 
hopes and fears. Only the affirmation of “faith in fundamental human rights [and ] in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, …and better standards of life in larger 
freedom”55  can release the true potential of time and of the human beings it has 
assembled together for the discovery of answers to common challenges and fears and 
the actualisation of common hopes and aspirations. For this reason, commentators 
link to the freedom of speech political discourse as a prerequisite for any country that 
aspires to democracy.56 Particularly because State affairs are often complex and even 
perplexing, it is only through open speech that stakeholders are able to contribute to 
the search for optimum outcomes. In this sense freedom of speech lends itself to the 
service of efficient government that is accountable ultimately to the electorate. It 
recognises a time honoured value that holds that wisdom is the most widely 
distributed gift that no one has monopoly over. But ZANU (PF) appears to proceed on 
the understanding that only it is the legitimate custodian of Zimbabwe’s destiny and 
that is unquestionable even by the electorate, not to mention fraternal, regional and 
international standards. Mcgregor57 writes, “… war veterans’ interventions have 
politicised all areas of public sector work and have seriously undermined the scope 
for professionalism within the public service. The ruling party has used veterans’ 
disruption to newly conflate party and State structures at district and provincial level, 
and to set up new channels of authority.” This conflation of party and State structures 
is a threat to the rule of law that safeguards freedom of speech where rule of law 
refers to “…those institutional restraints that prevent governmental agents from 
oppressing the rest of society”.58 Where the right to freedom of expression is denied, 
there cannot be any real scope for enjoyment of the right to democratic entitlement. 
 
3. A people abandoned: Zimbabweans and the infamous 2002 Presidential 
Election 
 
   Events leading up to the 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential election pointed to a country 
tittering towards anarchy. In his analysis of the relation between the church and the 
State in independent Zimbabwe, Dorman59 writes that the initiation in 1997 by the 
Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) of the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA) which resulted in defeat of government proposals in the referendum on a new 
constitution for Zimbabwe set the stage for the violent elections of June 2000. 
McGregor60 writes that:  
 
From February 2001, veterans stormed local authorities in districts 
where the political opposition had strong support - primarily but not 
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exclusively in Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces. They locked 
district council and other local government offices, closed some 
schools and demanded the dismissal of numerous officials, councillors, 
teachers and workers. Officials were suspended from their jobs and 
subjected to a procedure of ‘vetting’ by war veterans in which they 
were accused of a wide range of offences from dancing on the 
photograph of the President, to campaigning for the opposition party, 
to maladministration and corruption. This process has received little 
comment from President Mugabe, war veterans, or party leaders - in 
contrast to war veterans’ interventions in other areas, such as land 
and labour issues - yet its consequences are potentially far-reaching. 
 
   Unprecedented relative success of the opposition in the 2000 national assembly 
elections inspired hope that in spite of widespread intimidation of the electorate by the 
government and even murder and torture of opposition supporters and activities, the 
ballot box still represented the best hope for Zimbabweans democratically to get rid of 
a repressive arrogant and incompetent regime. But that limited success appears also to 
have awakened President Mugabe to the challenge that lay in wait for him in the 2002 
Presidential election. His strategy was not to endear himself to the electorate by 
admitting failure to manage a once illustrious economy in the region and to suggest 
possible strategies of recovery. No! He sought to put the fear of God in them and if 
they persisted against him, to deny them finally by disenfranchising them. Impotent 
they would feel in his grip, while he reproached internationally acknowledged values. 
In these circumstances what possibilities remained for Zimbabweans to enjoy the 
right to democratic entitlement?  
 
   Politicisation of the Zimbabwean bench through hounding out of office of the Chief 
Justice of Zimbabwe, Justice Antony Gubbay and other senior justices, and 
appointing to senior positions of junior judges aligned to ZANU (PF) meant that 
Courts, which previously checked the executive, could no longer be relied upon to 
safeguard the rights of people labelled as enemies of ZANU (PF). Once one was 
publicly identified as an enemy of ZANU (PF),61 then all the safeguards of police 
protection and due process did not apply for them. The Police even ignored previous 
Court Orders62 to “… ignore instructions of the executive that were contrary to 
judicial decisions”.63 As a consequence, press freedom, which was already under 
threat, was severely compromised. Bombs went off at nearly all the precincts of the 
independent press. Their editors were frequently arrested and tortured and then 
released without charge. This applied also to local human rights NGO personnel that 
previously investigated allegations of human rights abuse. Activists of these 
organisations found themselves targets of the same brutality. They soon found 
themselves scrambling for the shores of Europe in search of political asylum and 
more importantly a “good” chance to report the extent of human rights violations 
occurring in Zimbabwe. But even the hope of those fleeing Zimbabwe to alert the 
international community about human rights violations in Zimbabwe died 
immediately they landed on the shores of Europe whereupon they found themselves 
incarcerated in detention centres alongside criminals while their applications for 
asylum were processed. Meanwhile human rights abuse in Zimbabwe stood a better 
chance of going unreported. In this way Europe became an unwitting accomplice to 
President Mugabe’s strategy to deny Zimbabweans enjoyment of their established 
right to democratic entitlement. 
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   With no Courts or independent press or local human rights NGOs with full working 
knowledge of the tactics of governmental agencies that effectively could be relied 
upon to check on the executive, perhaps Zimbabweans should have looked up to 
regional institutions such as the SADC and the OAU (now African Union) to prevent 
President Mugabe from denying them their right to democratic entitlement. But at 
numerous meetings at poignant times both SADC and OAU leaders cuddled up with 
President Mugabe in spite of their full knowledge of his campaign of terror against his 
people. The OAU turned a very blind eye and a very deaf ear to Zimbabweans’ plight 
under President Mugabe as he intensified his campaign of terror against his people 
and deflected attention from a government that had ruined a formerly thriving 
economy. Perhaps fraternal organisations like the Commonwealth States and the EU – 
Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner could have stepped in when Zimbabweans needed 
them most. Commonwealth States Heads of Governments Meetings (CHOGM) and 
Commonwealth Ministerial committees on numerous occasions shied away from 
taking action even when the United Kingdom Prime Minster and his Foreign 
Secretary respectively pressed for tangible action to be taken to stop President 
Mugabe’s campaign of terror against those he perceived as opponents of ZANU (PF). 
Prince Charles, who is to succeed the Queen as the head of the Commonwealth 
warned that: “… if the Commonwealth could not stand up for liberal democracy and 
human rights, it deserved to be treated with international contempt”.64 This is 
surprising for an organisation that regards respect for human rights and democratic 
government as the centrepiece of its architecture. Paragraph 9 of the Harare 
Declaration (1991) states: 
  
Having reaffirmed the principles to which the Commonwealth is 
committed, and reviewed the problems and challenges which the 
world, and the Commonwealth as part of it, face, we pledge the 
Commonwealth and our countries to work with renewed vigour, 
concentrating especially in the following areas:  
 
1) the protection and promotion of the fundamental political 
values of the Commonwealth:  
2) democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect 
national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of 
the judiciary, just and honest government; 
3) fundamental human rights, including equal rights and 
opportunities for all citizens regardless of race, colour, creed 
or political belief. 
 
   At a conference of CHOGM held in Australia, immediately before Zimbabwe’s 
2002 Presidential election, Tony Blair described as “… a fudge to hold together a 
fragmented club” the decision not to take action on Zimbabwe until after the election. 
For its part the EU huffed and puffed but took no decisive action when it needed to. In 
this period Zimbabweans might be excused for thinking that the UN was probably in 
intensive care unit. Besides a series of demonstrative press releases of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights expressing concern over the deteriorating situation 
in Zimbabwe because of the scale of documented cases of rights abuses against 
members of opposition groups, the independent media and human rights 
organisations65 and expressive reports of UN experts over erosion in Zimbabwe of the 
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right to freedom of opinion and expression the UN has done little else to ensure 
enjoyment of the right to democratic entitlement by Zimbabweans particularly in the 
2002 Presidential election. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression on 22 August 2001 expressed concern to the Zimbabwean 
government about allegations that a hit list had been compiled by the Law and Order 
section of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) that included Basildon Peta, news editor of the weekly Financial 
Gazette and correspondent for the Independent of London and the Star of 
Johannesburg; Geoff Nyarota, editor of the Zimbabwe Daily News; Iden Wetherell, 
editor of the Zimbabwe Independent; Mark Chavunduka and Cornelius Nduna, editor 
and news editor of the Standard Newspaper respectively.66 The only action the UN 
took on this occasion was to “appeal to the Government to take all necessary 
measures to ensure that the right to freedom of opinion and expression is fully 
protected, in accordance with article 19 of the UDHR and the ICCPR”.67 Similarly, 
the UN Special Raporteur on the Independence of judges and Lawyers expressed 
grave concern over President Mugabe’s nullification of a Supreme Court order of 27 
February 2002 that struck down electoral legislation on the grounds that it had been 
improperly enacted. By an executive edict published in the Government Gazette on 5 
March 2002 President Mugabe reinstated the same legislation, asserting that it had 
been validly enacted and “shall be deemed to have been lawfully” adopted.68 The 
Special Rapporteur underlined the seriousness of this action thus: 
 
Seen in the light of previous attacks, harassment and intimidation of 
the judiciary by the executive and others, as well as defiance of court 
orders by the Government, are indicative that Zimbabwe is no longer a 
government of laws but of men who have no regard whatsoever for the 
independence of the judiciary and the majesty of law. 
 
Defiance of court orders in effect is the defiance of the rule of law. 
When it is the Government and its agents who defy then governmental 
lawlessness becomes the order of the day.69  
 
   When the UN makes demonstrative comments of disapproval of a government’s 
campaign of State terror against its own people and expresses disgust at a 
government’s abuse of basic human rights of individuals on which pursuit of the UN 
mandate is based that are as serious as this and stops at that, the question ought to 
follow: When does State terror legitimate direct UN intervention to uphold the human 
dignity of victims within their own States.70 Is it only after genocide has been reported 
as in the case of Rwanda? If so then the UN’s mandate should be revised to an 
international organisation concerned with punishing perpetrators of genocide. This 
would enable creation of institutions for stopping governments from perpetrating 
terror against their own people something the UN Charter already proscribes. Where 
was the UN when President Mugabe was challenging all that it purports to stand for in 
the 2002 Presidential election?  If the UN continues with what appears to be a “let 
others try first and if the problem persists, then we step in” kind of approach, then it 
might as well revise its mission statement of “never again ‘this’ and never again 
‘that’” to something else because the same practices continue to happen under its very 
own nose. Unless the human rights violations in question are massive, sudden and 
unprecedented, the United Nations appears to drag its feet like lawyers who often get 
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there after the war and not before. This approach might suggest to would be tyrants 
that if they planned their campaign of terror to stretch over a long period where 
people are killed in trickling numbers, tortured intermittently and raped discretely, 
then they might get away with it. Or is the UN after Somalia hesitant now to engage 
in “abortive missions”? If it is, what then is the hope for those caught up between a 
government that uses State terror and a UN that is hesitant to stand up for its norms 
when they are being questioned as one Zimbabweans found themselves in the two 
years leading up to the 2002 Presidential election and also during that election?71 That 
the state of protection of human rights of individuals should raise these questions at 
all about an organisation established to establish and maintain world peace shows the 
inadequacy of present mechanisms for the protection of human dignity under the UN 
system. It recommends perhaps the need urgently to develop mechanisms for the 
prevention of similar outcomes elsewhere in the future. The status quo manifests a 
frightening sense of complicit with President Mugabe’s of the organisations to which 
Zimbabweans had reason to look up to for protection from abuse in the last two to 
three years. In the two years leading to the 2002 Presidential election, the period with 
the worst countrywide violation of human rights since Zimbabwe’s independence 
from Great Britain in 1980, not a single Security Council Resolution was passed on 
the situation in Zimbabwe. There is no gainsaying speculating about the Security 
Council’s omission given that the situation in Zimbabwe threatened and continues to 
threaten enjoyment by Zimbabweans of the right that Justice Brandeis described as 
“the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilised men”.72 
 
   After the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the Zimbabwe crisis should mark the 
watershed of what international civil society has for some time now been agitating 
for, that is, creation at least of a United Nations (UN) Police and Security Force under 
the mandate of the Security Council of a democratised UN.73 Members of the civil 
society that work together to hold governments, business, and international agencies 
accountable for their responsibilities and commitments have been advocating this for 
some time now. They are fierce advocates for issues that the inter-State dynamic has 
conveniently sidestepped for decades such as equity and sustainability. They are 
providers of voluntary services for the needy.74 The UN’s mission is to secure lasting 
peace, so that the world will never again witness tragedies and human suffering akin 
to the Second World War.  
 
   Acknowledgment of the fact that the Westphalian inter-State compact of the UN 
requires for the delivery of the organisation’s purpose, a radical shift from inter State 
niceties to establishment of Tran censual mandated institutions and mechanisms that 
guarantee and further respect for human rights and the rule of law by all governments: 
our only hope for peace. It is so obvious that if we are going to have world law, we 
need world peace. For that to happen we need the kind of political institutions that are 
capable of giving us that law, of administering that law, and of judging under that 
law.75 It is puzzling therefore that the actions of those shaping and developing the 
structures on which our present and future lives are predicated appear indifferent to 
this fact. For the most part the present political institutions appear to reduce us to 
mere spectators of State terror when it arises. At best we appear to be toothless 
bulldogs whose bark is the only thing those threatening our world peace have to take 
note of as they wreak horror and havoc and prowl with impunity in our stare or glare. 
They even indulge us in the luxury of negotiating with them on their own terms about 
their transgressions, and we play along because of our desperation. Yet such tyrants 
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are no more than trustees that must submit themselves to the will of those they rule 
over. Errant trustees not only lose the privileges of trusteeship. Often they end up in 
jail.  
 
4. Upholding the right to democratic entitlement: International 
responsibility for promotion of respect for international human rights of 
individuals 
 
a.  The Focal Point for Electoral Assistance Activities initiative 
 
   The UN has always recognised the need progressively to develop mechanisms that 
facilitate realisation of its objectives as set out in the UN Charter, the UDHR and 
other documents. General Assembly Resolution (GAR) 46/137 reiterates the 
significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), which establish 
that the authority to govern shall be based on the will of the people, as expressed in 
genuine and periodic elections. It emphasises that: 
 
1) periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable 
element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and interests of the 
governed,  
2) that determining the will of the people requires an electoral process 
that provides an equal opportunity for all citizens to become 
candidates and put forward their political views, individually and in 
cooperation with others, as provided in national constitutions and 
laws,  
3) the international community should continue to give serious 
consideration to ways in which the United Nations can respond to the 
requests of Member States as they seek to promote and strengthen their 
electoral institutions and procedures.  
 
   Therefore, the declaration reinforces the idea that States are required under 
international law to promote and strengthen democratic practice necessary for 
enjoyment of the right to democratic entitlement. To that end, in 1991 the UN 
Secretary-General designated the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs as the 
Focal Point for Electoral Assistance Activities. The Electoral Assistance Unit (re-
designated as the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) in 1994) was subsequently 
established in the Department of Political Affairs to assist the Focal Point in carrying 
out his/her functions. In practice, the objectives of United Nations electoral assistance 
are essentially two-fold: 
 
1) to assist Member States in their efforts to hold credible and legitimate 
democratic elections in accordance with internationally recognized criteria 
established in universal and regional human rights instruments, and 
2) to contribute to building the recipient country’s institutional capacity to 
organize democratic elections that are genuine and periodic and have the full 
confidence of the contending parties and the electorate.76 
 
States’ voluntary uptake of this facility underlines the enduring centrality to 
international order of the doctrine of sovereignty. The State has to need and to request 
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this facility. Obviously governments bent on disenfranchising their populations by 
bandaging the electoral register, enacting legislation that impede free expression of 
opinion, and expel observer groups from friendly nations will not request the UN for 
this service. While the majority of Zimbabweans would have liked to see more 
external election observers participating in the 2002 Presidential election, ultimately it 
was their government that had to decide whether or not the UN EAD was to be invited 
or not. This points to a fundamental weakness in the inter-State model of international 
relations. The presumption here is that governments will ordinarily invite the organ. 
The fact however is that repressive regimes will not. Perhaps the organ should be 
enabled to invite itself to monitor national elections or at the request of human rights 
NGOs working in the country. Given the centrality of right to democratic entitlement 
in the UN system, continued membership of the organisation should be made to 
depend on EAD satisfaction that national elections had passed off freely and fairly. 
 
b. The Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) initiative 
 
   The Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) initiative is probably the most 
radical and most promising initiative targeted at realising the main purposes of the 
UN listed in the preamble of the Charter and other places. The organisation’s 
founding fathers were determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity of and worth of the human person. Article 1(3) of the Charter states that 
one of the purposes of the UN is to achieve international cooperation in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms. And article 
55c requires the UN to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all. The UN has achieved so much in the area of 
treaty creation to denominate issues that States should defer to individuals as 
recognition of their human dignity. In matters of enforcement, more still needs to be 
done if denominated rights such as the right to democratic entitlement are to be 
realised by all persons on earth. Enforcement has suffered largely because the UN 
appears to have been premised upon two very wrong presumptions, “first, that the 
Security Council could be expected to make speedy and objective decisions as to 
when collective measures were necessary; and second, that States would enter into the 
arrangements necessary to give the Council an effective policing capability”.77 
Creation of link mechanisms that compensate for the current enforcement deficit by 
promptly responding to intrastate crises that threaten or cause actual breach of human 
rights is probably the next big step in the effort to promote respect for human dignity 
among States. To that end, in 1993 a UN planning team was mandated to “develop a 
system of stand-by forces, able to be deployed as a whole or in parts anywhere in the 
world, within an agreed response time, for UN peace-keeping operations and 
missions”.78 This resulted in the creation of the system known as UN Stand-by 
Arrangement System (UNSAS) based upon commitments by Member States to 
contribute specified resources to the UN for peacekeeping operations mandated under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter.  
 
   That effort was carried forward when on 15 December 1996, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden signed a Letter of Intent on 
co-operating on the establishment of a framework for a multinational force 
(SHIRBRIG). This was followed up by the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on setting up a Steering Committee to supervise the 
establishment of the Brigade, and a MOU on establishing a permanent planning 
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element (the PLANELM). The PLANELM, which was established in Denmark, is a 
small permanent multi-national staff of the Brigade responsible for the development 
of standard operating procedures for the Brigade, to work on the concept of operations 
and to organize and conduct joint exercises. On deployment, the PLANELM forms 
the nucleus of the deployed SHIRBRIG HQ staff.79 Already 14 nations have signed 
one or more SHIRBRIG documents necessary for them to participate in the organ. 
Five more nations Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan and Senegal have 
participated as invited observers. This broad appeal of SHIRBRIG recommends 
enthusiasm about the whole project. Nonetheless, participation of States more 
experienced at peace-keeping missions would benefit the organ enormously because 
at the moment not all contributions under the UNSAS meet the set readiness and self-
sufficiency targets. Some of the allocated forces are not fully prepared and none of the 
staff officers and the units are trained or have co-operated before deployment. 
Precious time is still lost from the moment a Security Council decision is made to the 
actual deployment of the peacekeeping force. Moreover, it is essential that more 
States participate in the organ for two reasons. First, the case-by-case approach to 
deployment of the organ to be applied by participating nations upon request of the 
Security Council does not auger well for the legitimacy of the organ. This may 
justifiably court the charge of inconsistent application of the organ in similar cases 
and poison the water for it. After similar experience with application of the doctrine 
of recognition of States80 the UN system should seek to avoid inconsistencies in its 
practice. However, this may be necessary in the early stage of the organ because the 
size of the brigade may still be too small to cope with all the requests that may come 
from the Security Council. For instance whilst still considering a Security Council 
inquiry on whether the organ would be available for a potential mission in UNIFIL, 
another informal inquiry was received from the UN on 16 June, asking if the organ 
would be available for a mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).81 A small organ 
could not magically do everything. Human, technical, practical and other resources 
need to be stocked up before any spending can occur, and the same applies for 
SHIRBRIG. Secondly, continued availability of the organ is necessary because of the 
unpredictable fashion in which events that threaten peace and security erupt around 
the world. Upon its return from (UNMEE) SHIRBRIG went into a reconstitution 
period, which meant that it would not be available for deployment for a period of 
anything up to twelve months. The whole purpose of SHRBRIG was to make 
available to the UN a rapid reaction army that would respond to missions such as 
preventive deployments, cease fire monitoring, supervising the separation of forces, 
as well as support for humanitarian aid operations. The brigade’s reaction time is set 
at 15-30 days following the decision of the participating nations to make them 
available for deployment upon request by the United Nations. Had a situation arisen 
requiring its deployment in while it was in “reconstitution mode” resort would have to 
have been had to the traditional painstakingly slow methods of coalition building and 
then deployment. But intrastate disturbances - what SHIRBRIG was principally 
designed to assist with - are usually very flammable and can engulf the whole country 
in a matter of days – before any coalition can be established. Consequently, the 
humanitarian catastrophe sought to be stopped with the use of organs such as 
SHIRBRIG may yet flourish because of the “on and off mode” practice necessitated 
by limitations in resource. With involvement of many more States in SHIRBRIG, it 
should be possible to have sufficient self-contained units to be deployed in troubled 
spots of the world while other units are in “reconstitution mode”. This would 
eliminate from SHIRBRIG the “on and off” mode which could be used by calculating 
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villains to injure their populations.   Countries that have met all the procedural 
requirements for participating in SHIRBRIG include Argentina, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Sweden. Finland 
has signed all documents less the PLANELM MOU. Spain has signed the Letter of 
Intent and Steering Commitee MOU. The Letter of Intent has been signed by Portugal 
and Slovenia.  
 
Conclusion 
 
   This article examined the possibility for enjoyment of the right to democratic 
entitlement in transitional States that are dominated by repressive, arrogant and 
corrupt governments that fake democratic requirements in order to ordain themselves 
with external legitimacy even though they may not have secured internal legitimacy 
of their own people. It showed that the right to democratic entitlement is arguably the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilised men. The UN’s 
founding fathers premised realisation of the organisation’s objectives on respect of 
this right. It is established in the preamble of the UN Charter itself, in several 
provisions thereof, and in numerous treaties that premise promotion of respect of the 
dignity of mankind. Yet some governments of transitional States are led by people 
that were themselves brutalised by colonial or racist governments. These leaders are 
only too keen to use the same force to deny their own people the rights that they were 
previously denied under alien or racist rule. Under the UN system, international law 
opposed colonialism and championed the right of people everywhere to self-
determination. Further, the UN developed principles that together galvanised 
democratic practice envisaged by the right to self-determination. These include the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to democratic entitlement. Both these 
rights are evident in numerous international and regional human rights instruments. 
They have been made the basis and purpose of fraternal organisations such as the 
Commonwealth States and the SADC. Collectively, these rights are immutable that 
international peace and security depend on democratic practice that enhances respect 
for human dignity.  
 
   The infamous 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential election challenges national, regional, 
and international conceptions of democratic entitlement of all Zimbabweans freely 
and fairly to participate in the governance of their country by electing a leader of their 
own choice. The election was characterised by disenfranchisement of large sections of 
the electorate first by bandaging of the electoral register, and where that was not 
possible, by tactical misadministration of the election process in areas where 
opposition support was strongest so that in the end many people simply were not 
given the chance to cast their vote on who Zimbabwe’s President should be for the 
next six years. It was also characterised by widespread use of State terror and 
intimidation, including torture, murder and rape, repressive security legislation, and a 
huge propaganda campaign by State media and persecution of the independent press. 
With neither the local Courts nor local NGOs nor regional and fraternal organisations 
there to shield them from President Mugabe’s persecution Zimbabweans had every 
reason to expect the United Nations whose own basic laws were being flouted to 
intervene for two reasons. First, to stop State terror and second to ensure observance 
of the right of Zimbabweans to participate in the governance of their own country by 
electing freely and fairly the President of their country. The UN Security Council 
passed no resolution on Zimbabwe’s state of affairs in spite of the fact that State terror 
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appeared to have been invoked to the service of securing an election result for 
President Mugabe. The UN Human Rights Commissioner’s demonstrative comments 
of concern and expressions of concern by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression made no difference at all both to President 
Mugabe and to the victims of his campaign of terror. The EU’s delay in taking 
measures which it could have in order to dissuade increasing State terror and 
subsequent decrying of the election result as foul are of little comfort to Zimbabweans 
that were denied the right freely and fairly to participate in the governance of their 
country in the 2002 Presidential election. Zimbabweans were left alone to confront 
President Mugabe’s campaign of terror as if the UN Charter had not yet come into 
existence, and if it had, as if the founding fathers had intended it to apply to “all 
people” except Zimbabweans under President Mugabe’s rule. 
 
   Perhaps the Zimbabwe crisis should mark a watershed in the area of human rights 
protection, particularly the protection of the right to democratic entitlement on which 
much of what the UN claims to stand for is premised. Greater support should be given 
to SHIRBRIG so that it will be able to intervene in Zimbabwelike situations and 
ensure that the claim of the UN Charter to pronounce human rights “for all people” 
rings true. Countries that preach human rights should be encouraged to ready 
themselves to defend those rights through SHIRBRIG whenever and wherever they 
are threatened. By acceding to SHIRBRIG States will ensure also that this organ is 
constantly available to a needy world, killing off its current “on/off mode”. 
Knowledge of its continued presence will discourage temptation of illegitimate 
governments to use State terror against their populations. Further, it will reduce 
seriously the possibility that participating States will turn down Security Council 
requests to intervene in troubled spots purely for lack of human resources. Only 
through immediate direct intervention in Zimbabwelike situations to prevent human 
rights abuses can we claim still to be true to the vision of a peaceful and secure world 
of the UN’s founding fathers. Raped women, tortured men and women, murdered 
persons and victims of fear would much rather they were living ordinary lives and not 
the lives of victims, whatever the promise of UN tribunals for those guilty of 
committing these crimes. Perhaps the time has come for the UN to take decisive 
action that will make real the promise of democracy contained in the UN Charter and 
various other treaties and declarations. The international community cannot convince 
itself that by postponing determination of the perceptive issue of external legitimacy 
until after the election has occurred they can affect the substantive issue of internal 
legitimacy, which is the goal in all elections. That is a sure way of facilitating denial 
of the enjoyment of the right to democratic entitlement in Zimbabwelike situations. 
Intervention that ensures enjoyment of that right should be the goal. Development of 
UN organs like SHIRBRIG so that they are available all the time for such 
deployment, and deploying them in Zimbabwelike so that they can ensure enjoyment 
of the right to democratic entitlement is what is required if we are to remain true to 
the imagination of the UN’s founding fathers to “ensure respect for the dignity of all 
people”. There is no gain decrying elections as “… a coldly calculated, pre-
determined outcome resulting from draconian legislation, widespread and sustained 
political violence and intimidation”82 if we foresaw the predetermination of a 
government to ordain itself with external democratic legitimacy at the expense of 
internal democratic legitimacy of its population, and did nothing about it. That 
approach plays straight into the hands of the illegitimate government’s strategy to 
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deny its population the right to democratic entitlement. Direct intervention for the 
purpose of securing democratic entitlement may no longer be an option. 
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